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Non-technical summary
In recent years, politicians like to ascribe lower growth rates of tax revenues to globalization and the
consequences of tax competition. Less interest is paid to another possible explanation: Inflation rates
have decreased markedly in industrial countries. The phenomenon of inflation – even of a moderate
level - boosting tax revenues is well known under the term “fiscal drag”. It is, however, important to
differentiate between a real and a nominal type of fiscal drag  Nominal fiscal drag can work the fol-
lowing way: With a progressive tax system and in the absence of perfect indexation, inflation shifts
taxpayers into tax brackets with higher marginal tax rates. This so called “bracket creep” leads to
rising tax income ratios. Since with positive nominal growth this relationship holds even in the ab-
sence of any real growth, the phenomenon can be called “nominal fiscal drag”. The real type of fiscal
drag does not depend on inflation. “Real fiscal drag” exists if the tax income ratio reacts positively to
an increasing real income.
For economic thinking it is not very pleasant to accept the existence of nominal fiscal drag since it
implies the existence of some form of money illusion in the political system. There is, however, perva-
sive evidence of empirical psychology for widely spread money illusion. Money illusion in the context
of wages has a close relation to money illusion in the context of taxes. In the case of wages workers
more likely accept a cut of real wages with nominal wage stability than with nominal reductions of
wages. The case of taxes and voters has an equivalent psychological structure: Voters more likely
accept an increasing real tax burden with a constant nominal net income than with a shrinking nominal
net income.
The degree of money illusion might differ among countries, for different kinds of taxes and it will also
depend on the extent of inflation. Fiscal exploitation of money illusion is easy if inflation automatically
increases real tax revenues without further political actions required.
With this background it is the objective of this study to measure by the use of time series analysis the
extent of both types of fiscal drag for different countries and different kinds of taxes. The time series
approach is preferable to looking at the characteristics of a given tax system for a certain point in
time. This static approach fails to take into account the fact that the tax system is endogenous itself
and that changes of the system are probably driven also by the extent of inflation and real growth.
2The study is based on OECD countries’ experience since 1965. The results allow for a classification
of countries which is helpful to identify cases that indeed might be confronted with a tighter fiscal
constraint in the future due to the end of high inflation rates.
The results suggest that the decline of long run average inflation rates will make a fiscal difference for
a majority of OECD countries. In these countries, tax revenues benefit from inflation. This overall
nominal fiscal drag works mainly through personal income taxes and social security contributions.
While the former does not come as a surprise due to well known bracket creeping effects the latter is
a new insight. Although social security contributions do in many countries not grow automatically with
inflation, it seems to be politically easier to increase contribution ceilings and rates in an inflationary
environment. This hints at the relevance of money illusion in the context of taxation. Voters might be
more willing to accept a growing real tax and social security burden if the net income does not de-
crease in nominal terms. In the countries where nominal fiscal drag exists it is persistent. Only in few
cases (Belgium and Germany for individual income taxes) inflationary experience of the seventies has
induced changes of the fiscal system in the direction of de facto indexation.
Finally, these results are related to present tax reforms. Recent reforms in the OECD tend to de-
crease income taxes and social security contributions at the cost of higher indirect taxation. Tax reve-
nues thus are restructured away from types with a significant degree of both nominal and real fiscal
drag towards types where fiscal drag hardly plays a role – be it of the nominal or real type. There-
fore, taking low inflation rates and tax reforms together the presumption seems well founded that
fiscal drag comes to an end.
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41  Introduction
In recent years, politicians like to ascribe lower growth rates of tax revenues to globalization and the
consequences of tax competition. Less interest is paid to another possible explanation: Inflation rates
have decreased markedly in industrial countries. Countries with formerly high long-run average rates
of inflation have succeeded in reducing them to levels close to zero. Although it might be premature
to speak about the “death of inflation”, it is hard to imagine for industrial countries a return of inflation
rates close to the levels of the seventies in the foreseeable future. In Europe, traditional high inflation
countries have entered EMU and are subject to a monetary regime that does not allow for an easy
way back into inflation.
The achievement of low or even zero inflation rates can be relevant for the development of real gov-
ernment revenues. While the seigniorage dimension has attracted some attention particularly in the
EMU context (for example GROS/VANDILLE, 1995), the impact of price stability on tax revenues has
been neglected. Studies like JAKSCH (1990) or SADKA (1991) deal with cases of very high inflation.
PERSSON/PERSSON/SVENSSON (1998) look into the Swedish case in one specific year (1994) and
actually find a substantial impact of inflation on real tax revenues. However, a study is lacking that
deals with the long-run consequences of disinflation for revenues in industrial countries as a whole.
The phenomenon of inflation – even of a moderate level - boosting tax revenues is well known under
the term “fiscal drag”. It is, however, important to differentiate between a real and a nominal type of
fiscal drag (URSPRUNG AND WETTSTEIN, 1992). Nominal fiscal drag can work the following way:
With a progressive tax system and in the absence of perfect indexation, inflation shifts taxpayers into
tax brackets with higher marginal tax rates. This so called “bracket creep” leads to rising tax income
ratios. Since with positive nominal growth this relationship holds even in the absence of any real
growth the phenomenon can be called “nominal fiscal drag”.
The real type of fiscal drag does not depend on inflation. “Real fiscal drag” exists if the tax income
ratio reacts positively to an increasing real income. Perfect indexation of tax brackets will not neu-
tralize this type. A perfectly indexed tax system that is nevertheless progressive in real terms leads to
rising tax income ratios with positive real growth.
5It will depend on the existence of both types of fiscal drag to what extent the era of low inflation will
be a restriction for the revenue side of OECD budgets. If it turns out that indexation has spread
widely since the inflationary expectations of the 1970s, the death of inflation would make no differ-
ence for government revenues. Revenue constraints would then depend on the existence of real fiscal
drag and future real growth rates.
With this background it is the objective of this study to measure by the use of time series analysis the
extent of both types of fiscal drag. The time series approach is preferable to looking at the charac-
teristics of a given tax system for a certain point in time (as it was done for Sweden by PERS-
SON/PERSSON/SVENSSON, 1998). This static approach fails to take into account the fact that the tax
system is endogenous itself and that changes of the system are probably driven also by the extent of
inflation and real growth. There can be a substantial difference between the degree of de lege in-
dexation and de facto indexation (PADOA SCHIOPPA KOSTORIS, 1993) where the latter takes into
account discretionary changes of tax rules that happen in the political process as a reaction to infla-
tion. The German case is an illustrative example. While any formal indexation is absent in the income
tax system due to a negative view on indexation in the German legal system, there have been regular
adjustments of tax brackets. The constitutional court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, has played a
crucial role for introducing partial indexation by forcing the tax legislator to make tax exempt the
subsistence level which is calculated on a real basis. Thus in spite of the complete absence of any
formal indexation in German tax tables, there exists today a considerable extent of de facto indexa-
tion
Similar considerations apply to real fiscal drag. There can be a substantial difference between the real
income elasticity of tax revenues for any given tax table and the de facto elasticity which treats tax
tables as endogenous and therefore takes into account their real growth driven adjustments.
Thus it has to be emphasized that the focus of this study is on de facto characteristics of tax systems
along the time dimension and not on de lege characteristics of a tax system for a given point in time.
The study is based on OECD countries’ experience since 1965. The results allow for a classification
of countries which is helpful to identify cases that indeed might be confronted with a tighter fiscal
constraint in the future due to the end of high inflation rates.
In the following section 2  theoretical considerations on the impact of inflation and growth on different
kinds of taxes are presented. Section 3 presents some descriptive statistics both along the time and
6the cross section dimension. Subsequently, the analytical framework is introduced that allows for the
measurement of the existence of both nominal and real fiscal drag (section 4). The econometric ap-
proach and the resulting tax profiles are presented in section 5. The final section 6 concludes.
2 Money Illusion and Fiscal Drag
For economic thinking it is not very pleasant to accept the existence of nominal fiscal drag since it
implies the existence of some form of money illusion in the political system. If voters would think
purely in real terms it is hard to see why politicians could use inflation to impose larger real tax bur-
dens on citizens.
However, there is pervasive evidence of empirical psychology for widely spread money illusion. As
SHAFIR ET AL. (1997) put it in their survey on money illusion: “people often think about economic
transactions in both nominal and real terms, ... money illusion arises from an interaction between
these representations, which results in a bias toward a nominal evaluation”. The evidence on the ex-
istence of money illusion comes from different fields: In people’s assessment of income, transactions,
contracts and investments (SHAFIR ET AL., 1997). Money illusion stands also as a central explana-
tion for the phenomenon of nominal downward wage rigidity: Workers and trade unions are more
inclined to accept real wage cuts if nominal wages do not shrink (AKERLOF ET AL., 1996).
Money illusion in the context of wages has a close relation to money illusion in the context of taxes.
In the case of wages workers more likely accept a cut of real wages with nominal wage stability than
with nominal reductions of wages. The case of taxes and voters has an equivalent psychological
structure: Voters more likely accept an increasing real tax burden with a constant nominal net income
than with a shrinking nominal net income.
The degree of money illusion might differ among countries and it will also depend on the extent of
inflation. With low inflation the nominal view leads to judgements that are also reasonable in real
terms. Awareness for the importance of real economic considerations can be expected to increase
with the inflation rate since people will start to notice that the nominal view is erroneous and leads to
wrong decision in everyday life. In the tax context this feeds the expectation that nominal fiscal drag
might work better in times of modest inflation rates whereas episodes of high inflation rates will make
it harder to increase real taxes under the monetary veil.
7The existence of money illusion in taxation will also depend on the type of tax and the type of tax-
payer. So it might be less plausible to assume money illusion for companies whose managers are
trained to think in economic terms than for private households with a probably lower degree of hard
economic thinking.
Apart from that, different taxes offer different scopes for the fiscal exploitation of money illusion.
Exploitation is easy if inflation automatically increases real tax revenues without further political ac-
tions required. This is the case for a progressive income tax with imperfect indexation of brackets.
OATES (1988) subsumes such built-in tax increases which are less clearly perceived than legislated
changes under the fiscal illusion heading. Thus, in the case of bracket creeping money illusion mixes
with fiscal illusion and both create favorable conditions for a real budget expansion.
Conditions are less favorable if inflation works the opposite way. Inflation automatically reduces real
revenues for taxes with a considerable lag between the taxable event and  the moment it is actually
paid. The negative effect of inflation for real revenues of a tax with a significant collection lag is famil-
iar as the Olivera-Tanzi effect (OLIVERA, 1967 and TANZI, 1977). In industrial countries collection
lags are probably relevant in the taxation of profits and property and less important in wage and in-
direct taxation or in regard to social security contributions which all are paid in a close timely context
to the taxable event.
Concerning corporate taxation where the Olivera-Tanzi effect could have relevance it should, how-
ever, be mentioned that there are also inflation effects working into the opposite direction (SADKA,
1991). For example, nominal accounting procedures lead to an overstatement of real income if de-
preciation allowances are calculated on the basis of historic nominal costs. So the overall sign of the
impact can not be decided by theoretical considerations alone.
If the Olivera-Tanzi effect dominates other effects, political passivity leads for corporate taxes to a
reduction of the real tax burden. In this situation, the existence of money illusion works into the op-
posite direction compared to individual income taxes: inflation makes it even difficult to keep real tax
payments constant because this would require a nominal increase of taxes.
Inflation can be expected to reduce the real turnout of  property taxation since Olivera-Tanzi is rele-
vant as well. This kind of taxation is often based on wealth measures of past periods or even on
8nominally defined tax bases like standard tax values for real estate (in Germany the Einheitswert).
Here again, money illusion would lead to a decreasing real tax burden.
The highest degree of inflationary neutrality should be expected from proportional taxes without a
significant collection lag. These conditions seem to be best fulfilled by transactions taxes like VAT.
Abstracting from hyperinflationary situations, neither bracket creep nor collection lag effects are at
work that could pave the way for an inflationary impact.
In regard to social security contribution which have an increasing importance for the revenue side of
the public sector in OECD countries, the arguments are somewhat contradicting. On the one hand it
can be  argued that inflation should reduce the real level (ALESINA AND PEROTTI, 1995): Social se-
curity contributions often are paid as a flat rate of income up to a maximum value. Even if the latter is
adjusted more or less regularly inflation would dampen revenues. On the other hand considerations
of money illusion and income taxation apply similarly to social security contributions. If employees
regard these contributions as income tax equivalents, the same logic applies: With inflation social
security contributions can be increased in real terms without reducing nominal net income. So money
illusion can help increasing the real turnout of this type of government revenues. Nevertheless a dif-
ference to income taxation remains. In most countries there is no automatism, real increases of social
security contributions have to be realized by discretionary steps like increases of contribution rates or
ceilings.
Real fiscal drag, i.e. the existence of a positive relation between tax revenues and real income on the
macro level, can not be explained by money illusion. It is also difficult to explain long-run real fiscal
drag on a macro level simply by the progression of a tax system. Under distributive objectives the
real bracket creep has undesirable consequences (STEYN AND FOURIE, 1996): If real growth bene-
fits all income classes it will tend to shift an ever larger share of taxpayers into the top range of mar-
ginal tax rates. In the end the progressive system would degenerate to a system of a flat proportional
rate unable to achieve corrections of relative income distribution. Therefore, if voters and politicians
like progression as an instrument to correct the relative income distribution it can be expected that in
the political process tax brackets will be adjusted for real growth. If these adjustments occur on a
regular basis, the tax ratio is not affected by real growth.
More adequate explanations for the existence of real fiscal drag obviously originate from arguments
being discussed in the context of Wagner’s Law like median voter’s tax price and income elasticity
9of public good demand (for example: BLANKART, 1998, 143-172). Abstracting from other kinds of
revenues the government budget constraint implies public expenditures to equal tax revenues. In this
sense saying that real fiscal drag exists for total taxes is almost synonymous to the statement that
Wagner’s Law holds.1 The empirical literature on the validity of Wagner’s Law is already broad (for
a recent survey see PEACOCK/SCOTT, 2000) and it is no direct objective of this study to further
elaborate on this issue. For the study of nominal fiscal drag it is, however, necessary to have some
understanding of the extent of real fiscal drag – the Wagnerian dimension – as a reference point. In
order to know how inflation changes the growth of tax revenues one has to know what the underly-
ing relation between taxes and real income is.
It is obvious that both types of fiscal drag are of a very different quality. While the nominal type has
to do with a lack of economic rationality in the form of money illusion that is in danger to be abused
by politicians, the real type can possibly be ascribed to voters’ preferences. This difference is im-
portant for normative conclusions: From an economic point of view the existence of nominal fiscal
drag will arouse more criticism than the existence of real fiscal drag. For the latter the normative con-
clusion crucially depends on the individual judgement concerning the optimal size of government.
3 Descriptive Analysis
Annual data on tax revenues used in this study originate from OECD Revenue Statistics. Data on
GDP and the GDP deflator originate from the OECD Fiscal Positions and Business Cycle database.
The following kinds of taxes are analyzed (in brackets line code of OECD Revenue Statistics):
- total tax revenues including social security contributions,
- taxes on income, profits and capital gains (1000), also subgroups individuals (1100) and corpo-
rate (1200),
- social security contributions (2000),
- taxes on property (4000),
                                                
1 It is no perfect synonym since Wagner’s law refers to a relation between the expenditure income ratio and per
capita income.
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- taxes on goods and services (5000).
24 OECD countries are included in the analysis (though not in every analytical step due to missing
values): Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), Denmark (DNK), Spain
(ESP), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Great Britain (GBR), Germany (GER), Greece (GRC), Ire-
land (IRE), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), Luxembourg (LUX), Netherlands (NLD), Norway (NOR),
New Zealand (NZL), Portugal (PRT), Sweden (SWE), Switzerland (SWI), Turkey (TUR) and the
United States (USA).
Tables 1 and 2 offer a first descriptive view of the data both in a time and a cross section perspec-
tive. The time dimension (Table 1) shows different developments for different kinds of taxation. The
overall increase of taxes can not easily be explained by inflation. Although the inflationary seventies
were characterized by a substantial increase of taxes the same is true for the second half of the low
inflation sixties. The picture would, however be compatible, with the existence of a combined real
and nominal fiscal drag. In this sense, high real growth could explain the increase of tax levels in the
sixties while the significant increase of inflation might have done the job in the two following decades.
Differences between types of taxes partially correspond to the above considerations: Almost two
third of the increase in the individual income tax ratio over the whole period took place in the infla-
tionary decade 1970-1980 – a clear indication for the absence of perfect indexation provisions and
the effectiveness of nominal fiscal drag in a progressive income tax system. Inflation did not boost
revenues from corporate income, goods and services or property taxes: these tax ratios did hardly
move or even declined in the seventies. Social security contributions show a behavior quite similar to
that of individual income taxation: inflation in the seventies was paralleled by a marked increase which
constitutes almost half of the increase in social security contributions over the whole period 1965-
1996.
Table 2 reveals some cross section characteristics for OECD countries. For that purpose, countries
are separated into two groups - countries below and above the median inflation rate and the median
real growth rate, respectively. With nominal (real) fiscal drag, high inflation (growth) countries should
be characterized by larger tax increases than low inflation (growth) countries. The ANOVA test for
differences in the mean shows significant differences along the inflation dimension. Increases of the
overall tax rate was more than 4 percentage points larger in high inflation countries than in low infla-
tion countries clearly indicating nominal fiscal drag in the cross section perspective. Statistically sig-
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nificant (on the basis of at least 10% significance level) are also the differences for income taxes and
– unexpectedly – taxes on goods and services. Differences for the growth dimension are not signifi-
cant with the exception of  corporate income tax where high growth countries show larger increases
of tax income ratios.
While these results indicate that inflation may indeed be relevant for real tax levels, the descriptive
aggregate view conceals substantial differences between countries and does not allow for a proper
distinction between real and nominal fiscal drag.
Table 1: OECD inflation, real growth and the change of tax ratios in different periods
(standard deviation in brackets)
average change of tax-GDP-ratioaverage
annual
inflation
(GDP
deflator)
average
annual
real
growth
(GDP)
total taxes
incl. so-
cial secu-
rity
total
income
taxes
income
taxes
individu-
als
income
taxes
corporate
property
taxes
taxes
goods
and serv-
ices
social
security
contribu-
tions
1965-
1970
0.0430
(0.0022)
0.0465
(0.0088)
0.0326
(0.0226)
0.0169
(0.0151)
0.0151
(0.0162)
0.0018
(0.007)
0.0000
(0.0021)
0.0062
(0.0108)
0.0093
(0.0081)
1970-
1980
0.1010
(0.0214)
0.0373
(0.0145)
0.0461
(0.0312)
0.0237
(0.0214)
0.0233
(0.0218)
0.0008
(0.0118)
-0.0028
(0.0055)
0.0005
(0.0116)
0.0234
(0.0187)
1980-
1990
0.0856
(0.0222)
0.0279
(0.0099)
0.0319
(0.0306)
0.0090
(0.0212)
0.0015
(0.0194)
0.0027
(0.0090)
0.0029
(0.0060)
0.0094
(0.0173)
0.0094
(0.0069)
1990-
1996
0.0563
(0.0079)
0.0246
(0.0074)
0.0128
(0.0235)
0.0007
(0.0157)
-0.0032
(0.0133)
0.0031
(0.0077)
0.0008
(0.0043)
0.0044
(0.0108)
0.0064
(0.0099)
total
period
(1965-
1996)
0.0774
(0.0281)
0.0334
(0.0137)
0.1234
(0.0451)
0.0503
(0.0371)
0.0368
(0.0362)
0.0084
(0.0137)
0.0009
(0.0088)
0.0205
(0.0238)
0.0486
(0.0266)
non weighted means
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Table 2: Changes of tax ratios in high and low inflation / real growth countries
change of tax-
GDP-ratio
1965-1996
mean of high
inflation
countries
mean of low
inflation
countries
significance
ANOVA (P-
value)
mean of high
growth coun-
tries
mean of low
growth coun-
tries
singificance
ANOVA
(P-value)
total taxes
incl. social
security
0.1522 0.1094 0.0256 0.1377 0.1226 0.4559
total income
taxes
0.0680 0.0401 0.0845 0.0585 0.0487 0.5563
income taxes
individuals
0.0537 0.0317 0.1862 0.0421 0.0414 0.9660
income taxes
corporate
0.0095 0.0078 0.7839 0.0142 0.0039 0.0775
property taxes -0.0025 0.0031 0.1496 0.0016 -0.0007 0.5560
taxes  goods
and services
0.0342 0.0090 0.0114 0.0273 0.0154 0.2618
social security
contributions
0.0528 0.0605 0.5375 0.0496 0.0634 0.2701
“high” and “low” stands for above and below median, non weighted means.
4 The Classification Approach
For the further analysis the following framework is used inspired loosely by a similar classification in
PADOA SCHIOPPA KOSTORIS (1993). Equation (1) serves to define the concepts of real and nominal
fiscal drag and to relate this differentiation to indexation.
The logic of these definitions is the following: The first consideration is of a real nature and is based
on the question how a real expansion of income affects the tax ratio in the absence of any inflation.
The second consideration is of a nominal nature and is based on the question how a nominal expan-
sion of income affects the tax ratio in the absence of any real growth.
(1) 
g
b
a
P
Y
Y
T
=
Real fiscal drag (real fiscal anti-drag) can be defined as a case where the tax income ratio reacts
positively (negatively) to an increase of the nominal income holding the price level constant, i.e. b>0
(b<0). Real fiscal drag is absent with b=0. It might be tempting to use the terminology progression
(regression) for this differentiation. As explained above, however, there is no self-evident relationship
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between static progression and real fiscal drag in the time dimension since the tax system’s degree of
progression is endogenously decided in the course of time and influenced by real growth and infla-
tion. Therefore it seems preferable to avoid this misleading terminology.
Nominal fiscal drag (nominal fiscal anti-drag) is given if a purely nominal expansion of income –
Y and P grow in the same proportion – induces a rising (decreasing) tax income ratio. Nominal fiscal
drag (nominal fiscal anti-drag) is thus associated with b  > g  (b  < g). Nominal fiscal drag is absent
with b  = g. Thus, the non-existence of nominal fiscal drag implies the function determining the tax
ratio to be homogeneous of degree zero in nominal income and the price level.
With the help of these definitions the classification scheme results from the combinations of possible
real and nominal fiscal drag types. For this classification the log-linear transformation (2) of equation
(1) is used which is also a convenient starting point for the empirical analysis.
(2) P
P
Y
Y
T
logloglog)log( Jba ++= with J =b-g
Table 3: Classification Scheme
nominal fiscal drag
absent negative positive
absent AA: b=0, J=0 AN: b=0, J<0 AP: b=0, J>0
negative NA: b<0, J=0 NN: b<0, J<0 NP: b<0,J>0
real fiscal
drag
positive PA:  b>0, J=0 PN: b>0, J<0 PP: b>0, J>0
The concept of indexation can now be related to this classification. Perfect indexation of a tax is
given when inflation does not have any impact on the way real income affects the tax level (J=0, i.e.
cases AA, NA and PA). All other cases are characterized by imperfect indexation. Here, however,
a further differentiation is necessary depending on whether imperfect indexation leads to nominal
fiscal drag of the same or the opposite sign as real fiscal drag.
Incomplete indexation is given whenever a purely nominal expansion of income has an effect of the
same sign as the effect resulting from a purely real expansion. In a system of real fiscal drag this
means b  > g  (case PP). In a system of real fiscal anti-drag this means b  < g  (case NN). In both
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cases, de jure or de facto indexation procedures work that offer a partial compensation for the infla-
tionary element of nominal growth in the determination of the real tax burden.
Over-indexation is given whenever adjustments of taxes for inflation do not only neutralize effects of
a merely nominal income expansion but even have an overcompensating character. In this situation a
purely nominal income expansion has an effect on taxes with the opposite sign to the effect resulting
from a purely real expansion. Within a structure characterized by real fiscal drag this means g >b
(case PN). With a structure characterized by real fiscal anti-drag over-indexation implies g < b
(case NP) .
Cases AN and AP do not fit easily into this indexation context. Both cases are characterized by the
fact that a merely nominal expansion of income has an effect on the tax income ratio while a real ex-
pansion has not. These cases are logically different from the preceding cases. While in the above
cases the inflationary impact is associated with an underlying effect from a real income expansion that
feeds into the nominal sphere, this real effect is absent here.
5  Resulting Tax and Country Profiles
A straightforward way to classify countries within the framework of Table 3 is to estimate equation
(2)’ with ut as the random disturbance term for each kind of tax and for each country.
(2)’ tt
t
t
t
t u   P
P
Y
Y
T
+++= logloglog)log( Jba
There are, however, two main econometric complications that have to be taken account of. First,
there might be a simultaneity problem as the tax ratio can have an impact on the explanatory variable
since the tax burden is likely to be a determinant for real income and might also affect the price level.
The use of instrumental variables is the standard way to deal with this difficulty.
Second, similar to the empirical approaches testing Wagner’s Law (HAYO, 1996) there is the danger
of spurious regression since the variables are likely to be integrated. Indeed standard unit root tests
(Augmented Dickey Fuller, not reported) indicate the existence of unit roots. The criticism for this
kind of  test is well known. A low power implies that often the null hypothesis of a unit root can not
be rejected even if the time series is stationary. Nevertheless, without further justification it would not
be legitimate to estimate equation (2) in levels. This justification could be derived from evidence for
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the existence of a cointegration relation. Since in the case of more than two variables the Engle-
Granger approach is not appropriate, the Johansen test for cointegration is applied.
The Johansen procedure (appendix A.1) clearly rejects the null hypothesis of the existence of none
or only one cointegrating relationship among the three variables. In a majority of cases the procedure
also rejects the null of the existence of at most two cointegrating equations and thus hints on the ex-
istence of three cointegrating equations. This outcome where the number of cointegrating equations is
equal to the number of variables indicates that the included time series are stationary. It obviously
stands in contrast to the results of the unit root tests. In regard of the low power of the latter the Jo-
hansen result can be regarded to dominate the results from the Dickey Fuller tests.
Thus, equation (2) is estimated in levels. In the instrument variables estimation the Newey-West co-
variance matrix is used which gives consistent estimates in the presence of both heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation. A time trend is included in the estimation of (2) in order to allow for long-run
changes in the tax structure. Lagged values of the explanatory variables are used as instruments.
In the appendix (A.2) the estimated coefficients are reported. Estimations are based on annual data
for 1965-1996. On the basis of at least a 5% level of significance all available country tax combina-
tions are classified according to the scheme of Table 1. Tables 4-10 summarizes the resulting pro-
files.
Judging on the basis of total government revenues, OECD countries can be divided into two groups.
Due to perfect de facto indexation inflation does not seem to have an impact on tax ratios in 10
countries, whereas in a majority of 13 countries the analysis indicates a positive nominal fiscal drag.
Apart from the case of Canada inflation never has a negative impact on the aggregate revenue level.
6 countries are of the super-neutral type in the sense that neither inflation nor real growth have a
measurable impact on revenues in relation to income.
Disaggregating government revenues reveals clear differences among types of taxation along both the
nominal and the real dimension. Turning to the nominal dimension, inflation tends to have effects that
confirms the empirical relevance of the above theoretical considerations.
Inflation is of significant importance in the case of income taxes. For income taxation, there is as ex-
pected a difference in sign between individual taxation and corporate taxation. For individual income
taxes government revenues – with the exception of Canada – are not hurt by inflation. On the con-
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trary, OECD countries are split even into one group with no inflationary impact and another group
with positive nominal fiscal drag. In contrast to that, corporate taxation is characterized by a signifi-
cant group of 7 countries with a negative impact of inflation on the tax level. In these countries infla-
tion seems to be helpful for companies to reduce tax burden. Thus Olivera-Tanzi like effects seem to
dominate effects with the opposite sign.
The insights from the descriptive analysis are also confirmed in regard to social security contributions
which show very much the same profile as income taxes on individuals, i.e. in a large group of coun-
tries inflation helps to increase the real burden. Property taxes similar to direct corporate taxes show
for a non negligible group of countries a negative impact of inflation on revenues and are largely neu-
tral otherwise. Taxes on good and services are the most neutral type of tax in the sense that here the
largest groups exist where any nominal fiscal drag is absent.
Having a short look on the real dimension it turns out that from the perspective of a revenue seeking
government real growth is not helpful to increase corporate income taxes, property taxes and taxes
on goods and services. On the contrary, for these revenue categories tax income ratios tend to de-
cline with real growth in a number of countries. For taxes on goods and services this negative impact
could possibly be explained by the fact that growth typically is accompanied by shrinking shares of
aggregate consumption in GDP. In contrast to that, social security contributions and individual in-
come taxes offer the widest scope for rising tax ratios under the condition of positive real growth.
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Table 4: Classification for total taxes including social security
nominal fiscal drag
absent negative positive sum
absent FIN,GBR,KOR,
LUX,TUR,USA
- AUT,ESP,FRA,G
ER,GRC,IRE,
JPN
13
negative - - ITA,SWI 2
real fiscal drag
positive DNK,NOR,NZL,
PRT
CAN AUS,BEL,NLD,S
WE
9
sum 10 1 13 24
Table 5: Classification for total income taxes
nominal fiscal drag
absent negative positive sum
absent AUT,GBR,GRC,
JPN,KOR,LUX,
NOR,PRT,TUR,
USA
- GER,IRE,ITA 13
negative - - ESP,SWI 2
real fiscal drag
positive DNK,FIN,NLD,
NZL,SWE
CAN AUS,BEL,FRA 9
sum 15 1 8 24
Table 6: Classification for income taxes individuals
nominal fiscal drag
absent negative positive sum
absent FRA,GBR,JPN,
KOR,LUX,TUR,
USA
- AUT,ESP,GER,
IRE
11
negative - - SWI 1
real fiscal drag
positive DNK,FIN,NLD,
NOR
CAN AUS,BEL,GRC,IT
A,NZL,SWE
11
sum 11 1 11 23
Table 7: Classification for income taxes corporate
nominal fiscal drag
absent negative positive sum
absent DNK,FIN,GBR,
GRC,JPN,LUX,
NLD,NOR
AUS,AUT,
IRE,USA
SWI 13
negative ESP,GER,SWE NZL,TUR ITA 6
real fiscal drag
positive BEL,FRA,KOR CAN - 4
sum 14 7 2 23
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Table 8: Classification for social security contributions
nominal fiscal drag
absent negative positive sum
absent CAN,DNK,KOR,L
UX,NOR,TUR,
USA
- GBR,GER,IRE,NL
D
11
negative - - AUT,JPN,SWI 3
real fiscal drag
positive FIN,ITA,PRT,
SWE
- BEL,ESP,FRA,GR
C
8
sum 11 0 11 22
Table 9: Classification for property taxes
nominal fiscal drag
absent negative positive sum
absent AUT,BEL,DNK,
FIN,GBR,JPN,
KOR,LUX,SWI,
TUR
ESP,GER,IRE,
USA
NZL 15
negative NLD,NOR,PRT,
SWE
AUS,CAN,
GRC,ITA
FRA 9
real fiscal drag
positive - - - 0
sum 14 8 2 24
Table 10: Classification for taxes on goods and services
nominal fiscal drag
absent negative positive sum
absent AUT,BEL,CAN,
DNK,FIN,FRA,
GER,GRC,JPN,
LUX,NLD,NOR,
SWI
USA KOR,PRT,SWE 17
negative ESP,GBR,IRE,
ITA,NZL
- AUS 6
real fiscal drag
positive - - TUR 1
sum 18 1 5 24
It is possible that the degree of indexation changes in the course of time. As suggested by the theo-
retical considerations above an experience of high inflation may increase awareness for real conse-
quences of inflation in the fiscal system and thus lead to de facto indexation. The case of Turkey with
an average inflation rate of 30 percent illustrates this view, since nominal fiscal drag is largely absent
for Turkey.
In the seventies, inflation rates in OECD countries on average more than doubled in comparison to
the second half of the sixties (see Table 1). This new experience might have induced changes of the
de jure indexation procedures or at least the de facto indexation behavior. Being made more alert by
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an inflationary decade voters might have forced politicians to correct more frequently for the conse-
quences of phenomena like bracket creep.  CUSUM tests indicate for a number of cases the possi-
bility of structural breaks in equation (2) around 1980 (not reported). On that basis, a Chow test
was applied to test for a structural break in 1980. In the majority of cases structural stability of equa-
tion (2) over the whole period can not be rejected with a significance level of at least 5% (see Ap-
pendix A.3). Among the cases with a structural break there is no general tendency in regard to nomi-
nal fiscal drag. There are only very few cases where inflation of the 70s seems to have induced a
change of fiscal structures towards indexation: For individual income taxation, Belgium and Germany
are the only cases, where a positive nominal fiscal drag before 1980 was neutralized afterwards by
de facto indexation. If one further takes into account that a number of the detected structural breaks
occur without inducing a change in classification, the conclusion seems to be justified that the struc-
ture as described in the Tables 4-10 is largely stable in qualitative terms.
6 Conclusion
These results suggest that the death of inflation or – to put it more modest – a decline of long run
average inflation rates will make a fiscal difference for a majority of OECD countries. In these coun-
tries, tax revenues benefit from inflation. This overall nominal fiscal drag works mainly through per-
sonal income taxes and social security contributions. While the former does not come as a surprise
due to well known bracket creeping effects the latter is a new insight. Although social security contri-
butions do in many countries not grow automatically with inflation, it seems to be politically easier to
increase contribution ceilings and rates in an inflationary environment. This hints at the relevance of
money illusion in the context of taxation. Voters might be more willing to accept a growing real tax
and social security burden if the net income does not decrease in nominal terms. In the countries
where nominal fiscal drag exists it is persistent. Only in few cases (Belgium and Germany for individ-
ual income taxes) inflationary experience of the seventies has induced changes of the fiscal system in
the direction of de facto indexation.
Nominal fiscal drag is largely absent for corporate and property taxes. There are, on the contrary,
significant groups of countries where nominal fiscal drag is negative. For corporate taxation this indi-
cates that in a couple of countries negative effects of inflation on the real turnout like the Olivera-
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Tanzi effect dominate positive effects, for example the one resulting from nominally defined deprecia-
tion allowances. For most countries indirect taxation revenues are not affected by inflation.
Real fiscal drag is less frequent than nominal fiscal drag. Where present it works mainly through indi-
vidual income taxation and social security contributions. Thus in principle, real fiscal drag would have
a chance to continue in these countries also in times of price level stability.
This outlook changes if these findings are related to present tax reforms. Recent reforms in the
OECD tend to decrease income taxes and social security contributions at the cost of higher indirect
taxation. Tax revenues thus are restructured away from types with a significant degree of both nomi-
nal and real fiscal drag towards types where fiscal drag hardly plays a role – be it of the nominal or
real type.
Therefore, taking low inflation rates and tax reforms together the presumption seems well founded
that fiscal drag comes to an end. This can also be stated in the context of Wagner’s Law: Govern-
ment expenditures can only grow as far as additional revenues can be raised. Assuming that other
sources like deficit finance or privatization proceeds are exhausted in most countries, taxes are cru-
cial. This study indicates increasing marginal political costs of tax financing a rise of public expendi-
tures. For a given income elasticity of the demand for public goods this tends to restrict the scope for
a future Wagnerian expansion.
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Appendix A. 1: Johansen Cointegration Test
The Johansen procedure was applied to the three variables P
P
Y
Y
T
log and log  ),log( , assuming an
intercept and trend in the cointegrating equation. On the basis of the Akaike statistic 5 lags were
included in the procedure. In the table, X**(*) means that the null of at most X cointegrating equa-
tions is rejected with a significance level of 1% (5%).
total taxes
incl. social
security
total income
taxes
income
taxes indi-
viduals
income
taxes corpo-
rate
property
taxes
taxes  goods
and services
social secu-
rity contribu-
tions
Australia 2** 2** 2* 2* 1** 2** -
Austria 2* 2** 2* 2** 2** 2** 1**
Belgium 2* 2* 2* 2* 2* 2** 1**
Canada 2* 1** 1** 2* 1** 1** 2*
Denmark 2** 2* 2* 1** 1** 2** 2**
Spain 2** 2** 1** 2* 1** 2* 2*
Finland 2** 1* 1** 1** 2* 1** 2*
France 2** 2* 2* 2* 1** 2* 2**
Great Britain 2** 2** 2** 2* 2* 1** 1**
Germany 2* 2* 2* 1** 1** 2** 2**
Greece 1** 1** 1** 1** 2** 1** 2*
Ireland 1** 2* 2* 1* 2* 1** 2**
Italy 2** 2** 2** 1** 1** 2** 2*
Japan 1** 1** 1** 1** 2* 2* 1**
Luxembourg 2** 2* 2** 1** 1** 2** 2**
Netherlands 2* 2** 2* 2** 2* 2* 1**
Norway 2* 1* 1** 1* 2** 2* 2*
New Zealand 2** 2** 2** 1** 2** 2** -
Portugal 1** 2* N.V. N.V. 1** 2** 2*
Sweden 1** 1** NONE** 2** 2* 2** 2*
Switzerland 2* 2* 2** 2** 2* 1** 2**
Turkey 1** 1** 1** 1** 1** 1** 1**
USA 2** 2** 2** 2* 2* 2** 2*
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Appendix A. 2: Coefficients for b  and J
in the estimation of tt
t
t
t
t u  t   Plog 
P
Y
log log
Y
T
log ++++= dJba)( (annual data 1965-1996, for Ko-
rea 1972-1996, instrumental variable estimation with lagged explanatory variables as instruments,
Newey-West covariance matrix, t-values in brackets, ***/**/* indicate significance level of 1/5/10%)
total taxes incl. social security total income taxes income taxes individual
Country b J b J b J
Australia
(AUS)
0.49366 ***
(3.181477)
0.205900 ***
(4.705975)
1.270029 ***
(4.528389)
0.257175 ***
(4.194302)
1.694365 ***
(6.018918)
0.587180 ***
(7.113008)
Austria
(AUT)
-0.26518
(-0.420453)
0.311281 ***
(6.764861)
0.338334 *
(1.757920)
0.251076 *
(2.029829)
0.364262
(1.665140)
0.795715 ***
(5.703695)
Belgium
(BEL)
0.465460 ***
(3.351416)
0.532972 ***
(5.608684)
1.569152 ***
(7.027271)
1.137628 ***
(4.946048)
1.604179 ***
(4.797697)
1.476237 ***
(6.199386)
Canada
(CAN)
0.754912***
(3.520082)
-0.332064***
(-3.790354)
1.959391***
(5.743846)
-0.763211***
(-5.949034)
2.315451***
(4.019889)
-0.742848***
(-3.360920)
Denmark
(DEN)
2.467312 ***
(8.558929)
-0.055963
(-0.820312)
4.909805 ***
(4.598182)
-0.256248
(-1.332402)
5.759941 ***
(4.986424)
-0.342991
-1.264323
Spain
(ESP)
-0.069340
(-0.480632)
0.2890.31 ***
(3.729330)
-0.568035 ***
(-2.956171)
0.471878 ***
(3.698758)
-0.037627
(-0.125608)
0.768155 ***
(8.712683)
Finland
(FIN)
0.928380
(1.529562)
-0.281468
(-1.249791)
2.039842 **
(2.079914)
-0.476849
(-1.369659)
2.595766 **
(2.484302)
-0.518473
(-1.372035)
France
(FRA)
-0.119923
(-1.872209)
0.245997 ***
(7.811419)
0.663196 ***
(5.632626)
0.182913 ***
(2.636685)
0.438863
(1.662268)
0.164861
(1.204336)
Great Britain
(GBR)
-0.148525
(-0.147403)
0.104167
(1.567132)
2.865308
(1.179036)
0.229696
(-1.418927)
4.757949
(1.565735)
0.246814
(0.904697)
Germany
(GER)
0.124016
(1.367951)
0.566397 ***
(8.150686)
-0.600008
(-1.597396)
1.137230 ***
(4.325558)
0.180378
(0.437896)
1.312362 ***
(6.318988)
Greece
(GRC)
0.497694 *
(1.934284)
0.339380 **
(2.387900)
0.921637 *
(1.765267)
0.150727
(0.616548)
2.752298 ***
(2.900742)
1.092294 **
(2.302562)
Ireland
(IRE)
-0.271839
(-1.326707)
0.165613 ***
(3.645594)
0.369938
(1.074747)
0.316960 ***
(9.495072)
0.425965
(0.766083)
0.598624 ***
(9.020218
Italy
(ITA)
-0.801759 ***
(-3.899398)
0.178468 ***
(3.749385)
0.080546
(0.393247)
0.717753 ***
(10.02505)
0.651153 ***
(3.798405)
0.747762 ***
(11.44608)
Japan
(JPN)
-0.071908
(-0.420663)
0.302299 **
(2.570684)
0.264276
(0.847998)
0.354473
(1.339342)
0.278230
(0.963839)
0.394570
(1.631450)
Korea
(KOR)
2.498054
(1.222398)
0.252212
(1.332754)
4.337575 *
(1.850693)
0.160469
(0.598774)
5.858221 *
(1.993738)
0.397259
(1.179955)
Luxembourg
(LUX)
3.964662
(0.970680)
4.047559
(1.290312)
4.394980
(1.122522)
4.733778
(1.580844)
5.764515
(0.859970)
5.965752
(1.161533)
Netherlands
(NLD)
0.383734 ***
(2.913205)
0.301577 ***
(5.191925)
1.470449 ***
(3.390393)
-0.046698
(-0.246868)
1.769521 ***
(3.169091)
0.002232
(0.008488)
Norway
(NOR)
2.483913 **
(2.708939)
-0.238297
(-0.823249)
1.920249 *
(2.005115)
0.078130
(0.383569)
2.646801 **
(2.091032)
-0.817341 *
(-1.722611)
New Zealand
(NZL)
0.862947 **
(2.695611)
0.165423 *
(2.004123)
2.456639 ***
(3.468348)
0.225081 *
(1.828895)
4.651071 ***
(3.323843)
0.557222 **
(2.556391)
Portugal
(PRT)
0.521283 **
(2.604417)
0.101419
(1.475376)
-0.552963
(-1.082048)
0.214702
(1.585599)
- -
Sweden
(SWE)
1.314512 ***
(4.844797)
0.351770 ***
(3.728392)
0.841203 ***
(4.042965)
0.120243
(1.223156)
1.320803 ***
(5.308052)
0.216223 **
(2.244298)
Schwitzerland
(SWI)
-0.877682 ***
(-2.999086)
1.243696 ***
(6.284769)
-0.834294 ***
(-2.778916)
1.815061 ***
(7.883643)
-1.177999 ***
(-3.104035)
1.965849 ***
(7.383898)
Turkey
(TUR)
2.424120 *
(2.024876)
0.043471
(0.690189)
3.478003
(1.183755)
-0.200187
(-1.322737)
4.869057
(1.268662)
-0.1202772
(-0.628463)
United States
(USA)
2.671841 *
(1.747516)
-0.089376
(-0.486396)
3.705861
(1.545695)
-0.097387
(-0.317210)
6.384834 *
(1.944876)
0.313416
(0.668903)
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Continuation Appendix A.2
income taxes corporate social security contributions property taxes
Country b J b J b J
Australia
(AUS)
0.226095
(0.413388)
-0.855228 ***
(-4.910308)
- - -1.285057 ***
(-5.164773)
-0.375452 **
(-2.068910)
Austria
(AUT)
-0.365311
(-0.835621)
-0.949149 ***
(-3.584585)
-0.414542 **
(-2.197411)
0.767531 ***
(5.588007)
-0.785169
(-1.536993)
0.963713
(1.540847)
Belgium
(BEL)
1.860873 ***
(4.612239)
-0.499871
(-1.347291)
0.490445 ***
(3.480134)
0.360563 ***
(3.016568)
-0.569563
(-1.523674)
-0.662330
(-1.319908)
Canada
(CAN)
2.016032***
(3.000747)
-1.168417***
(-2.877951)
0.975576
(1.228259)
-0.321829
(-1.106836)
-1.114430***
(-4.263438)
-0.305511**
(-2.081475)
Denmark
(DEN)
-3.882182 *
(-1.761491)
0.776730
(1.110203)
-15.50301 *
(-1.856744)
0.853875
(0.596911)
1.631452 *
(1.747364)
0.171446
(0.968301)
Spain
(ESP)
-1.390801 **
(-2.455057)
-0.222590
(-0.536458)
2.158519 ***
(5.764577)
0.533501 ***
(4.180892)
0.127310
(0.558508)
-0.614659 ***
(-3.308556)
Finland
(FIN)
-1.694963
(-1.666565)
-0.348952
(-0.945672)
3.915605 ***
(3.039915)
-0.9843392 *
(-1.709166)
-2.133942
(-1.401422)
0.763445
(1.135812)
France
(FRA)
1.106687 **
(2.340218)
0.356804 *
(1.908969)
0.302589 **
(2.524881)
0.370991 ***
(7.851602)
-2.558208 ***
(-7.019720)
0.474336 ***
(3.064627)
Great Britain
(GBR)
-0.860463
(-0.129631)
0.312309
(0.771242)
0.377637
(0.172905)
0.245624 **
(2.446232)
-6.711560
(-1.602908)
-0.221376
(-0.741702)
Germany
(GER)
-5.021791 ***
(-4.820208)
0.503155
(0.507889)
0.300053 *
(1.953642)
1.044192 ***
(10.51090)
-0.256479
(-0.801853)
-0.648802 ***
(-0.648802)
Greece
(GRC)
-0.372298
(-0.434673)
-0.633076
(-1.304701)
1.385372 **
(2.158012)
0.774455 **
(2.338638)
-3.818798 **
(-2.559669)
-2.222625 ***
(-2.948279)
Ireland
(IRE)
1.926972 *
(1.922532)
-0.948808 ***
(-6.252414)
1.400079 *
(1.958474)
0.716567 ***
(8.670327)
-0.696851
(-0.907953)
-0.975281 ***
(-10.03250)
Italy
(ITA)
-1.221070 **
(-2.326550)
0.685297 ***
(4.603165)
0.475902 **
(2.456731)
-0.058407
(-1.218915)
-4.606191 ***
(-4.621288)
-0.749536 ***
(-3.048953)
Japan
(JPN)
0.210293
(0.479187)
0.362720
(1.058297)
-0.235841 ***
(-4.552354)
0.592294 ***
(13.82676)
-0.145745
(-0.498449)
0.236562
(1.177829)
Korea
(KOR)
5.176028 **
(2.224395)
0.565456 *
(2.038600)
14.76737
(1.490130)
-0.013572)
(-0.013853)
3.405870
(0.802236)
-0.203226
(-0.702110)
Luxembourg
(LUX)
2.014241
(0.436392)
2.663370
(0.694520)
6.765803
(1.055523)
6.186346
(1.240126)
-2.897054
(-1.062478)
-2.163297
(-1.025952)
Netherlands
(NLD)
0.347281
(0.736580)
-0.135954
(-0.906645)
-0.005210
(0.012598)
0.740203 ***
(5.809170)
-1.476733 **
(-2.179621)
0.256865
(1.019131
Norway
(NOR)
0.325249
(0.061671)
3.038115 *
(1.983903)
6.281869 *
(1.957199)
-0.947545
(-0.832791)
-3.647412 ***
(-3.247939)
0.497506
(1.156326)
New Zealand
(NZL)
-3.531800 **
(-2.139448)
-1.086581 ***
(-3.345921)
- - 0.698862 *
(1.739946)
0.367897 ***
(4.191153)
Portugal
(PRT)
- - 1.841350 ***
(3.812946)
-0.018301
(-0.139217)
-4.993529 ***
(-3.745661)
-0.675298
(-1.104518)
Sweden
(SWE)
-3.687685 ***
(-5.189841)
-0.573939
(-0.955602)
3.798354 ***
(3.410102)
0.787380
(1.647050)
-6.076669 ***
(-2.972296)
1.239533
(0.954090)
Schwitzerland
(SWI)
0.947692
(1.544183)
1.054414 **
(2.463079)
-1.288445 ***
(2.771270)
2.049300 ***
(6.743951)
-0.745265
(-1.262567)
0.409943
(1.198104)
Turkey
(TUR)
-10.21442 **
(-2.056865)
-0.408654 **
(-2.362794)
-6.053573
(-1.313171)
-0.248502
(-1.382020)
5.602037
(1.233214)
0.105818
(0.443612)
United States
(USA)
-0.590890
(-0.109983)
-1.676010 ***
(-4.048101)
6.962519 *
(1.752606)
0.647508 *
(1.756394)
1.081440
(0.633890)
-1.011554 ***
(-7.302943)
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Continuation Appendix A. 2
taxes on goods and services
Country b J
Australia
(AUS)
-0.709552 **
(-2.202432)
0.299505 ***
(2.953646)
Austria
(AUT)
-0.099930
(-0.447648)
0.178654
(0.974033)
Belgium
(BEL)
-0.457201 *
(-1.921505)
-0.039394
(-0.374419)
Canada
(CAN)
0.179514
(0.747003)
0.164301
(1.084643)
Denmark
(DEN)
0.823554
(0.750942)
0.161945
(1.306287)
Spain
(ESP)
-2.537477 ***
(-4.628817)
-0.117713
(-0.345667)
Finland
(FIN)
-0.594214
(-1.177228)
0.201016
(1.212335)
France
(FRA)
-0.249220
(-1.694702)
0.098553 *
(0.056521)
Great Britain
(GBR)
-4.802921 **
(2.221145)
-0.253739
(-1.000302)
Germany
(GER)
0.733932 *
(1.931849)
-0.336679
(-1.424832)
Greece
(GRC)
0.194179
(0.512095)
0.356131 *
(1.801883)
Ireland
(IRE)
-0.607940 ***
(-2.798768)
0.142508 *
(1.938220)
Italy
(ITA)
-2.059882 ***
(-4.791339)
0.000452
(0.003941)
Japan
(JPN)
-0.425598 *
(-1.753160)
-0.078412
(0.131152)
Korea
(KOR)
0.175078
(0.168803)
0.400976 ***
(3.473467)
Luxembourg
(LUX)
0.606097
(0.181826)
1.133347
(0.431443)
Netherlands
(NLD)
0.126473
(0.751672)
0.085787
(1.442603)
Norway
(NOR)
1.900697 *
(2.013310)
-0.303338
(-1.014273)
New Zealand
(NZL)
-2.412219 ***
(-3.086062)
0.024915
(0.168597)
Portugal
(PRT)
0.271436
(1.511263)
0.184318 **
(2.710813)
Sweden
(SWE)
-0.062820
(-0.147361)
0.369749 **
(2.096690)
Schwitzerland
(SWI)
-0.562491
(-1.581736)
-0.132279
(-0.811922)
Turkey
(TUR)
3.176363 ***
(2.963492)
0.249756 ***
(4.624966)
United States
(USA)
-0.715178
(-0.915910)
-0.216095 ***
(-3.958878)
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Appendix A. 3: Two period classifications for cases with significant Chow
breakpoint test at 1980
On the basis of  a 5% significance level for Chow test. Details of estimation as described in Appen-
dix A. 2.
total taxes incl. social security
country 1965-1979 1980-1996
b J classification b J classification
Belgium -0.066578
(-0.387899)
0.215817**
(2.631719)
AP -1.200954**
(-2.697691)
-0.000988
(-0.008996)
NA
Germany -0.295463
(-0.752338)
0.079059
(0.164156)
AA 0.076711
(0.852577)
0.569544**
(2.186127)
AP
Ireland -1.577657***
(3.184458)
-0.43312***
(-4.721303)
NN 0.494052
(0.574530)
0.694856
(1.755438)
AA
Luxembourg -1.436626***
(-3.970098)
1.110026
(1.275777)
NA 0.447496
(0.300586)
0.573269
(0.00387)
AA
total income taxes
Country 1965-1979 1980-1996
b J classification b J classification
Belgium 0.562066*
(2.010124)
0.479643 **
(2.943222)
AP -3.530485**
(-2.178537)
-0.744772 *
(-1.861805)
NA
Great Britain -8.380625***
(-4.039344)
-1.254279***
(-5.290697)
NN -1.490345
(-0.643694)
O.968453
(1.508503)
AA
Germany -0.933071
(-0.876014)
0.312004
(0.240632)
AA -0.124735
(-0.374053)
-1.635565**
(-2.210264)
AN
Ireland -2.417815*
(-1.951435)
-0.119482
(-1.052475)
AA -0.216736
(-0.163475)
0.102884
(0.169044)
AA
Luxembourg -0.678656
(-1.129970)
0.417590
(0.456372)
AA 0.815381
(0.426789)
1.101374
(0.750334)
AA
New Zealand 2.808750
(0.344106)
0.738629
(0.496985)
AA -0.003183
(-0.007525)
-0.110631
(-1.293641)
AA
Turkey 0.696300
(0.974128)
0.033115
(0.632706)
AA 8.709768
(0.195095)
0.990217
(0.310870)
AA
income taxes individual
country 1965-1979 1980-1996
b J classification b J classification
Belgium 0.194591
(0.578679)
0.584465***
(3.461517)
AP -2.003873
(-1.339374)
-0.378720
(-1.270793)
AA
Great Britain -11.78130***
(-3.457054)
-1.303702***
(-3.133163)
NN 1.475917
(0.886410)
-0.208473
(-0.408125)
AA
Germany 0.882558
(0.730450)
2.039490**
(2.300170)
AP 0.136917
(0.579895)
-0.767255
(-1.014061)
AA
Ireland -3.504644**
(-2.301375)
-0.171966
(-1.112923)
NA -1.567793
(-1.254194)
-0.161783
(-0.298909)
AA
Japan 0.195438
(0.172567)
-1.485816
(-0.440034)
AA 1.362828
(1.467056)
3.137019***
(4.235799)
AP
Luxembourg -1.247978
(-1.593056)
2.086672
(1.064965)
AA -0.462365
(-0.348441)
0.119253
(0.111813)
AA
New Zealand 4.731300
(0.332177)
1.076162
(0.425047)
AA 0.379122
(1.083764)
0.018010
(0.334576)
AA
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income taxes corporate
country 1965-1979 1980-1996
b J classification b J classification
Spain -1.573498
(-0.729635)
-1.097868
(-1.276096)
AA 3.364387**
(2.329376)
2.069538***
(4.352118)
PP
Ireland 0.226899
(0.117883)
-0.170539
(-0.351928)
AA 6.627627
(1.167881)
1.005853
(0.384605)
AA
Luxembourg 0.481418
(0.267650)
-2.293549
(-1.090429)
AA 2.577415
(0.928052)
2.528703
(1.221216)
AA
New Zealand -3.891298
(-0.274744)
-1.085279
(-0.430493)
AA -1.102448
(-0.482310)
-0.669857
(-1.434391)
AA
USA -1.152365
(-0.137534)
1.681479*
(2.017006)
AA 5.837469
(1.336252)
-5.284833*** AN
social security contributions
country 1965-1979 1980-1996
b J classification b J classification
Belgium 1.194672***
(5.582283)
0.713771***
(5.788007)
PP 0.267163
(0.310586)
1.150700***
(6.384464)
AP
Germany 0.676402
(1.093503)
1.184863**
(2.745626)
AP -0.041322
(-0.400305)
0.942014***
(3.016546)
AP
Ireland 1.232042
(-0569445)
-0.365879)
(-1.122847)
AA 0.889632
(0.630887)
0.957704
(1.490768)
AA
Luxembourg -2.362292***
(-5.078366)
2.014734**
(2.224343)
NP -0.425459
(-0.475818)
-0.446573
(-0.653617)
AA
Netherlands 2.078667*
(1.923509)
1.380180
(1.034222)
AA -3.572602*
(-1.955364)
-0.616988
(-0.270507)
AA
property taxes
country 1965-1979 1980-1996
b J classification b J classification
Australia -0.996414
(-0.661514)
-0.565027
(-0.810621)
AA -2.732828
(-0.188789)
0.534457
(1.191565)
AA
Belgium -3.795946***
(-5.947375)
-1.284106**
(-2.885600)
NN -2.271602
(-0.444068)
-0.298427
(-0.185938)
AA
Germany -2.422171*
(-1.919301)
-2.125669*
(-2.035771)
AA -0.255116
(-0.807244)
-0.122411
(-0.179798)
AA
Italy -5.918703
(-0.819974)
-0.738198
(-0.583446)
AA -4.118626
(-0.642216)
-2.245472***
(-5.137953)
AN
Portugal 2.925957*
(1.884026)
-0.601286
(-1.759835)
AA 3.017410*
(1.998917)
-0.019598
(-0.058773)
AA
Sweden 1.303772
(0.413553)
0.668352
(0.474884)
AA -13.52834
(-0.496999)
8.685219
(1.055194)
AA
Turkey 0.811733
(0.181242)
-0.403192)
(-1.611131)
AA -4.200051
(-0.100105)
0.390011
(0.133705)
AA
taxes on goods and services
country 1965-1979 1980-1996
b J classification b J classification
Austria 0.617224***
(3.780100)
0.042925
(0.364490)
PA -2.755639
(-1.527278)
-0.569464
(-0.324753)
AA
Great Britain 0.736293
(0.404740)
-0.076601
(-0.625081)
AA 3.905170
(-1.098418)
0.991630
(1.055503)
AA
Germany 0.072851
(0.153146)
-1.008283***
(-3.233456)
AN 0.514130
(1.444611)
2.629037***
(3.386466)
AP
Ireland -0.624961
(-0.744147)
-0.578095***
(-4.414430)
AN 0.697978
(1.175911)
0.929820***
(3.421550)
AP
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Italy 1.340953
(0.560257)
0.138877
(0.377381)
AA 4.415966
(1.324269)
-0.091628
(-0.293877)
AA
Luxembourg -1.566508*
(-2.056692)
1.988119
(1.499835)
AA -0.174988
(-0.083796)
0.240905
(0.148484)
AA
New Zealand -0.555131
(-0.298492)
-0.027631
(-0.075000)
AA -1.640747**
(-2.555228)
0.531006***
(4.364527)
NP
Sweden -3.804322***
(-3.390653)
-1.865355***
(-3.690440)
NN 0.117506
(0.063591)
1.093071**
(2.516222)
AP
Switzerland -0.073428
(-0.687147)
-0.678884***
(-5.770417)
AN -1.134202
(-0.679593)
-1.517343
(-1.699048)
AA
